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"An intellectual equivalent of a raid" is how a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) staffer 
described US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's proposal for a rapidly deployable 
response force during the September 2002 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers. With relatively 
little warning to Alliance colleagues, Mr. Rumsfeld proposed the establishment of a robust, NATO 
force capable of more than just "flag-waving." This force, often referred to as the NATO 
Response Force or NRF, is intended not only to have fairly sharp teeth but also to be the vehicle 
that brings other Alliance forces and concepts into the 21st century. Many observers believe that 
this US proposal, timed as it was just a few months before the Prague Summit, was offered to 
downplay the Summit's enlargement policies (thereby not offending the Russians) and to give 
NATO Allies one last clear chance of developing a credible war-fighting capability. A kinder view 
holds that the NRF is a bit of an olive branch designed to allay fears of increasing US 
isolationism, particularly based on American exclusion of NATO during major portions of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and presents a tangible link between the United States, NATO and 
even the European Union (EU).[1] Everyone recognizes that NATO's European members need to 
increase their military capabilities relative to their American counterpart. The NRF may offer a 
way to refocus national economic resources devoted to the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 
and to serve as the catalyst for NATO's military "transformation" efforts.  
The NRF is generally described as a powerful military force designed to stand alone for up to 30 
days with land, air, maritime and command elements. It will consist of a combined arms brigade 
including both heavy & light ground forces; it includes a composite air element capable of 
performing a wide range of offensive, defensive and logistic air operations; and its maritime 
component will likely contain a carrier battle group-sized surface force as well as amphibious, air 
and submarine forces. More importantly to the Europeans, this force is designed to have the joint 
intelligence, targeting, planning and command and control capabilities that are the true 
discriminator between US and European militaries.  
If organized, trained and equipped properly, this joint and combined force will give NATO a 
significant crisis response capability, especially in the area where European Union efforts fall 
short: warfighting capability.  
The End of History 
50 years of NATO memory has a persistent influence on contemporary security structures and 
policies. To NATO's credit, its 1999 adaptation to the end of the Cold War was fundamental, 
monumental and appropriate; it finally and formally recognized that its traditional threat was gone; 
it moved from the static/active defense concepts of the prior decades toward a strategic concept 
that emphasized security missions outside of traditional NATO areas; and it stressed the 
importance of developing new capabilities to meet new threats. Furthermore, operations in the 
Balkans and Afghanistan have accelerated thinking that NATO's military relevancy lies, not in the 
ability to provide heavy land forces or tactical fighter planes in defense of NATO territory, but 
rather in the ability to act quickly to stabilize distant situations which, left untended, could break 
out into a larger conflict. Political, social and economic chaos is the new perceived enemy of The 
Western State. This changed environment requires new tools: better intelligence, quicker force 
generation, greater power projection, and more precise weaponry. Perhaps the most vexing 
challenge is developing the command and control mechanism to pull all those tools together and 
put them to work. 
From DCI to PCC 
The NRF concept should be understood within the context of the Defense Capability Initiative's 
(DCI) failure to close the gap between European and US military technologies and capabilities. 
DCI was launched in September 1999 during NATO's Washington Summit. DCI was, "designed 
to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their 
capabilities to face the new security challenges"[2] and was prompted by the experience over 
Kosovo's skies and US-European airbases. As the air war was underway, NATO leaders realized 
that, despite Europe's relatively large fleet of tactical aircraft, only a few Allies had the capability 
of participating in US-led air operations. Europe lagged behind the US in military capabilities. DCI 
set a course to close this gap by focusing European defense acquisition efforts and budgets on 
five key shortfalls[3] : 
• Mobility and deployability: i.e. the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are 
needed, including areas outside Alliance territory  
• Sustainability: i.e. the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases 
and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations  
• Effective engagement: i.e. the ability to engage an adversary in all types of operations, 
from high to low intensity  
• Survivability: i.e. the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future 
threats  
• Interoperable communications: i.e. command, control and information systems which 
are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work 
effectively together  
Unfortunately, Europe's political appetite was bigger than its financial stomach, and in the 
subsequent years, NATO's European nations made little progress. In fact, most European 
defense budgets declined during the intervening years.[4]  
To be fair, the current problem is not just lack of political will. NATO's cumbersome multi-year 
force planning apparatus makes it hard to focus on immediate requirements.  
In the months leading up to the 2002 Prague Summit, it became clear that DCI was not moving 
ahead. Last minute efforts were undertaken to mitigate a perception of an outright failure and to 
repair sluggish efforts to improve NATO's military capabilities. The DCI was quietly retired and 
replaced by the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC). The name change had three general 
purposes: to start a new clock and use Prague as the initiation point; to keep the focus on specific 
capabilities; and, to emphasize commitment to the Alliance.  
US officials also proposed creating the NATO Response Force (NRF). As the "catalyst for the 
transformation of Alliance capabilities" the NRF replaced enlargement at center stage at the 
Prague summit and was wholeheartedly endorsed by the Heads of State. NATO nations will 
contribute formations to the NRF and these units will become recipients of national "high-tech" 
reform. Once these units receive these upgrades, they are rotated through the highest NRF 
readiness window and then spread their experience and institutional knowledge back to their 
national forces and ultimately into an Alliance-wide military culture of modernity.  
Missions 
Both EU and NATO language has focused heavily on a buzzword, "capability." Before putting the 
capabilities-cart in front of the mission-horse, however, a question needs answering: what load is 
the NRF being asked to carry? On one hand, it would be nice to have a modernized, conventional 
force capable of working with US units at high levels of interoperability. Outfitting combat aircraft 
with Link-16 communication equipment and precision-guided munitions (PGM), purchasing 
strategic lift assets, or simply upgrading the existing logistic units would all further the PCC goals, 
ESDI objectives, and help make the NRF a reality. On the other hand, having NATO forces ready 
to meet future challenges would be extremely useful to the United States. Creating, for example, 
NATO unmanned aerial vehicle, missile defense, nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) detection 
and decontamination or even computer network attack/defense units would not only help lighten 
the US load in these areas, but would also indicate NATO sincerity in meeting new threats. NATO 
planners are aware that political leaders will look to the NRF as a one-size-fits-all force and 
demand from it more than is reasonable. NRF missions could include "traditional" military 
missions like deploying air, maritime or ground forces as a show of force, serving as an initial 
entry force, and conducting stand-alone offensive or defensive joint operations.[5] Crisis response 
missions like non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) or humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief also are expected. But giving the NRF "new" missions like theater missile defense and 
"consequence management" (including responding to a weapon of mass destruction event) are 
hot topics. The issue of using the NRF to undertake"pre-emptive" strikes is even more heated. 
Structure 
America's geo-strategic position over the last century has given it a rich experience with 
expeditionary warfare, rotational systems and graduated readiness. Consequently, Allies can 
obtain data that shows, for example, optimal rotation lengths, readiness windows and 
organization and structures. Unfortunately, this experience and data may not be applicable to 
NATO's collective understanding of an NRF concept. Differing ideas about NRF missions and 
structures are the crux of the current problem. National considerations based on recruitment, 
training, assignments, structures and most importantly budgets will require adjustments in the US 
proposal.  
The structures needed to support an NRF concept, for example, may grow beyond that originally 
envisioned by the United States. Is their one NRF or two? Or three? Or, is a new NRF to be 
generated for every rotation, ad infinitum. One NRF could likely be created in a matter of days 
just by having nations come together to conduct a force generation conference. But to achieve 
the desired level of readiness and the lethality (and then maintain them indefinitely) NATO 
nations require enough forces and headquarters to maintain one NRF ready to go into action 
within days, one NRF undergoing training and certification, and another NRF being generated 
from forces not included in either of the first two "rotations" (or in a recovery or refit cycle). 
Considering that each rotation will involve about 20,000 personnel, the complete package could 
easily require 60,000 people. Given that the United States lacks a synchronized joint rotational 
system or standing joint task force headquarters,[6] it might be too much to expect that NATO's 
nations will collectively plan, train, equip, operate and command an effective NRF. 
The NRF's air component will provide a rapid deployment capability, as part of a joint and 
combined force, to conduct the full range of air tasks using advanced air-to-air and precision 
guided air-to-surface munitions. The C2 system should be able to control several hundred sorties 
per day and conduct the functions of air defense, air reconnaissance, close air support, air 
interdiction, combat search and rescue, target acquisition, airborne early warning, and tactical 
airlift. In addition, the air component should have air-to-air refueling capability and some national 
officials suggest that it should include a dedicated strategic airlift necessary to deploy, sustain 
and redeploy the NRF.[8] Getting NATO's European Allies to modernize their 4,500 combat 
aircraft (a number larger than the aviation assists available to the United States) so all ofthem are 
all-weather capable and fitted with PGMs will be a crucial step forward for the NRF.  
The land component for the NRF will call for the deployment of a brigade-size formation, with 
support assets to allow it to operate over the full range of land tasks and terrain. The tricky part of 
establishing this ground component will be to create an appropriate mix of heavy, light and 
airborne forces, as well as to provide combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). 
NATO defines combat arms to include only infantry or armor units. It considers CS and CSS 
elements to include, air defense, artillery, aviation, engineer, special forces as well as military 
police, communication, NBC defense, logistics, medical, psychological operations, civil military, 
and public affairs personnel/units. Convincing NATO nations to reorient their forces toward 
lighter, more deployable forces with some of these specific CS/CSS capabilities will be an 
important part of NRF success. 
The NRF maritime component currently has the greatest interoperability but also suffers from the 
largest gap between current and planned capabilities. The NRF's maritime component will consist 
of a force of up to a NATO task force size including a carrier battle group with associated surface 
and subsurface combatant units, amphibious forces, and naval mine counter-measure units and 
support vessels. Such a force should be able to conduct the full range of maritime tasks, including 
interdiction, air defense, amphibious operations, freedom of navigation, anti-submarine warfare, 
naval mine counter-measure warfare, naval air strike missions and necessary dedicated strategic 
sea lift. Determining the new relations with NATO's most successful multinational and 
interoperable formations, like the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Mediterranean will help 
make the NRF a reality but the creation of more carrier battle groups poses a significant 
challenge to European defense budgets. 
Perhaps the principle controversy surrounding the NRF is whether it is a real "unit" that comes 
into existence (or three units that come on and off cycle) or is it a consortium of loosely 
coordinated forces that simultaneously rotates through readiness windows? The best solution 
also is the most costly. Ideally, NATO could create three equal force packages that rotate through 
the calendar four months at a time. This simple cycle would also rely on identification of a small 
pool of specific low density/high demand capabilities that may be "permanently" on call. Rotation 
of forces will be required if the NRF is to be sustained. 
Command & Control  
Although there are many issues to be resolved, participants tend to agree that the Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) is the primary tool to command and control (C2) the NRF. The NATO 
CJTF, modeled on the US JTF concept, has been under discussion and development since 1994 
and has evolved toward either a static Joint Force Command HQ generating a deployable CJTF 
HQ or one using a sea-based CJTF HQ capability.[11] The command element for the NRF will 
most likely require a standing structure with dedicated staffing to meet the 5 day crisis response 
timeline. Table 1 shows a possible configuration for NRF command and control structure and the 
associated deployability time line for each HQ or command element. Any of the three HQ 
elements listed could command the NRF. 
 
NRF C2 Configuration 
Linked to this short deployment timeline, is the need for a coordinated political/military approach 
to crisis response. Though NATO has continually worked to improve its crisis management 
procedures, having a force capable of moving so quickly may outstrip lengthy political debates 
and cumbersome parliamentary approval procedures. 
Historically, NATO's strength has always been found in its ability to reach a consensus; the 
unanimity of member nations signal determination to protect individual and collective interests. 
Reaching consensus, however, is not without its drawbacks. Political decision making can 
proceed at a snails pace. The NRF, with its limited military aims but faster response time, will 
require predelegated authority to strategic and operational commanders to conduct military 
planning in advance of political decisions.  
Will It Work? 
The answer to the "will it work" is a resounding "maybe." The key challenge for NATO over the 
past decade has been reinventing its structures, capabilities, and decision making processes so 
that it can meet the security needs of its member states. The cold war mechanisms that produced 
multiple corps geared toward a conventional war in Europe, have proved to be resilient to 
change. Initiatives to revitalize and restructure the Alliance toward a more responsive and 
deployable military force are consistently dulled. With the failure of DCI, many observers look to 
the NATO Response Force as a last chance for NATO to transform itself into the relevant 
organization that keeps both sides of the Atlantic interested in the Alliance. Its success or failure 
will be determined by the nations that ultimately provide not only the funding for such a force, but 
also the personnel needed to make the NRF a reality. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Europe Resources 
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